Extending Horn clause logic with implication goals  by Giordano, Laura et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 95 (1992) 43-74 
Elsevier 
43 
Extending Horn clause logic with 
implication goals* 
Laura Giordano, Albert0 Martelli 
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universitri di Torino, C..so Svizzera 185, 10149 Torino, Ital 
Gianfranco Rossi 
Dipartimento di Matematica e Informutica, Universitci di Udine, Via Zanon 6, 33100 Udine, Italy 
Communicated by G. Levi 
Received July 1989 
Revised March 1990 
Abstract 
Giordano, L., A. Martelli and G. Rossi, Extending Horn clause logic with implication goals, 
Theoretical Computer Science 95 (1992) 43-74. 
The paper deals with the problem of extending positive Horn clause logic by introducing 
implication in goals as a tool for program structuring. We allow a goal G, in a clause G, A A G, + 
A to be not only an atom but also an implication D 3 G (we shall call it an implication goal), 
where D is a set of clauses and G a goal. This extension of the language allows local definitions 
of clauses in logic programs. In fact, an implication goal D 1 G can be thought of as a block 
(D, G), where D is the set of local clause declarations. In this paper we define a language with 
blocks in which, as in conventional block structured programming languages, static scope rules 
have been chosen for locally defined clauses. We analyse static scope rules, where a goal can 
refer only to clauses defined in statically surrounding blocks, and we compare this extension with 
other proposals in the literature. We argue, on account of both implementative and semantic 
considerations, that this kind of block structured language is a very natural extension of Horn 
clauses when used as a programming language. We show it by defining an operational, fixpoint 
and model-theoretic semantics which are extensions of the standard ones, and by proving their 
equivalence. We show also that static scope rules can be obtained by interpreting + as classical 
and + as intuitionistic implication with respect to Herbrand interpretations. 
1. Introduction 
A number of recent research efforts in logic programming have focused on the 
problem of introducing local dejinitions of clauses in logic languages. The main 
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motivation for such an extension is to provide an elegant solution to the lack of 
program structuring facilities, which is widely recognized as one of the main draw- 
backs of Horn clause logic as a programming language. 
Different approaches have been advocated to face this problem in different 
proposals. For instance, Bowen and Kowalski [2] show how to introduce local 
definitions at the metalevel, whereas Warren [16] proposes a modal operator 
“assume”. Gabbay and Reyle [3,4] present N-Prolog, an extension of logic 
programming which allows local definitions and which is designed mainly to 
deal with hypothetical reasoning. A similar extension is proposed by Miller [II] 
and more recently by McCarty [lo]. Relying on a similar idea, Monteiro and 
Port0 [14] propose “contextual logic programming” to develop a theory of 
modules in logic programming. Nait Abdallah [ 151 defines “ions” to deal with local 
definitions. 
In this paper, we aim at defining a logic language with blocks in the style of 
conventional programming languages. To this purpose, we tackle the problem of 
local definitions of clauses by extending positive Horn clause logic with 
implication goals, that is by allowing implications of the form D 3 G, where G is a 
goal and D is a set of clauses, to occur in goals and in clause bodies. In fact, 
an implication goal D 1 G can be considered as a block (0, G), where D is a 
set of clause definitions local to G (that is, clauses in D can be used only to 
prove G). 
The approach of using implication in goals as a structuring tool is analogous to 
that advocated by Gabbay and Reyle [3,4], Miller [ll], McCarty [lo] and Monteiro 
and Porto [14]; our proposal, however, differs from those in many respects. In fact, 
according to the semantics chosen for the implication goal, several different 
extensions of Horn clause logic can be obtained, each one characterized by different 
visibility rules for locally defined clauses. 
In particular, in this paper we pursue the idea of defining a logic language with 
static scope rules for clause definitions, in which, as in most conventional program- 
ming languages, the rules for using a clause are determined by the static nesting of 
blocks in the program text. Indeed, static scope rules have the well-known advantage 
to allow efficient implementations of the language by means of compilation tech- 
niques. The problem of defining suitable visibility rules for locally defined clauses 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section, where we shall give an informal 
description of the language with blocks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we define more precisely 
the language with blocks by means of its operational semantics. We show there that 
a unique implication connective is not sufficient for the language and thus we must 
introduce two different implications with different meanings: one in definite clauses 
(G,A. . . A G, + A) and the other one in goals (D 2 G). 
In Section 4 we define the jixpoint semantics of the language as an extension of 
the standard fixpoint semantics for Horn clauses. The operational semantics is shown 
to be sound and complete with respect to the corresponding fixpoint semantics. 
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An interesting problem is to see if this kind of language allows also a model- 
theoretic semantics. In Section 5 we show that a very simple semantics can be given 
as an extension of standard semantics by defining satisfiability of formulas with 
respect to interpretations (subsets of B(P)). Satisfiability is defined as in the standard 
case (so + is the classical implication) with the addition of the definition for D 1 G, 
which is satisfiable in an interpretation I if and only if D implies G in all the 
interpretations I’ which contain I. Thus we do not need a general Kripke semantics 
(with worlds) as in the case of N-Prolog [3,4] whose model-theoretic semantics is 
that of intuitionistic logic. In our case, it is sufficient to consider a subset of Kripke 
interpretations. This kind of semantics possesses properties analogous to those of 
the classical case, such as a minimal model which can be shown to be equal to the 
least fixpoint. 
The model-theoretic semantics of 3 given in Section 5 is different in general form 
the intuitionistic semantics. However, in Section 6 we show that the two semantics 
are equivalent for the language of the paper with respect to Herbrand interpretations, 
and therefore we can consider + and 3 as the classical and intuitionistic implication, 
respectively. 
In Section 7 we introduce a more concrete operational semantics for the language 
and we give some hints on possible efficient implementations of this language in 
the style of conventional programming languages. 
2. Visibility rules for locally defined clauses 
An implication goal D = G can be considered as a block, where G is a goal and 
D is a set of local clauses. The set of clauses D corresponds to local procedure 
declarations in conventional programming languages. Since G can be itself an 
implication goal or can contain implication goals, it is possible to have nested 
blocks. Moreover, implication goals are allowed also in the bodies of the clauses. 
Indeed, a goal Gi in a clause G, A. . . A G,, + A can be not only an atom but also 
an implication D = G. In the following we describe different semantics which 
implication goals can be given. 
2.1. Closed blocks 
A natural meaning for the implication goal D 2 G is that of G being a logical 
consequence of D. In other words, it is quite natural to define the derivability of 
an implication goal in the following way: D 2 G is derivable from P if G is derivable 
from D, disregarding the content of l? With such an informal semantics, the 
implication goal clearly defines closed environments of clause definitions (hereafter 
called closed blocks). In this case, the goal D 1 G clearly corresponds to the 
metapredicate demo( “D”, “ G”) defined by Bowen and Kowalski [2]. 
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Example 1. 
G=s 
P={q, 
The program P is composed of two clauses, the second one containing a block 
definition. The goal G succeeds from the program P since q is provable in P and 
p is provable in the closed block ((r + p) A r). If, on the contrary, the second clause 
of P is replaced by the clause 
the goal G would fail. In fact, in this case, q is called from the inner block while 
its definition is in the outer program. 
A block structured language requires the introduction of explicitquanti~ers specify- 
ing the scope of variables. In fact, since a clause definition can occur in the body 
of another clause, it is necessary to distinguish between its local variables and 
variables coming from the external environment. The use of explicit quantifiers 
allows us to give static scope rules to variables. 
Let us consider two simple examples of closed blocks with explicitly quantified 
variables. We shall use a Prolog-like syntactic notation in which a program is 
represented as a set of clauses separated by a dot, and “,” is used in place of “A”. 
Example 2 (Miller [ 131). 
VL, K (rev(L, K) :- 
{VK revl([], K, K). 
VX, L, K, Act (revl([X 1 L], K, Act) :- revl(L, K, [X IAcc])) 
] 2 revl(L, K, [I)). 
In this program a predicate rev( L, K) is defined which is true when K is the reverse 
list of L (e.g. rev([a, b, c], [c, b, a])). The procedure rev makes use of the predicate 
revl(L1, L2, L3) which builds up in L3, element by element, the reverse list of Ll 
and then gives it back in L2. Since rev1 is called only within rev, it is convenient 
to define it locally to rev rather than in the global database. 
Explicit quantifiers for variables allow nonlocal variables to occur in locally 
defined clauses. Hence closed blocks are closed with respect to clause definitions 
but not with respect to variables occurring in them (differently from theories in 
Bowen and Kowalski’s proposal [2], which are closed also w.r.t. variables). 
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Example 3. 
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VA, Ll, L2 (subset([Al Ll], L2) :- 
{VL memberA([Al L]). 
VX, L (memberA([X 1 L]) :- memberA( 
} 2 memberA( L2), subset( Ll, L2)). 
VL2 subset([], L2). 
The predicate subset(L1, L2) is true if Ll is a subset of L2 (e.g., sub- 
set([ a, c], [a, b, cl)). A predicate memberA( L) is defined locally to it and tests the 
occurrence of a given element A in the list L. The variable A in the first clause of 
memberA and is not local to that clause; it is quantified in the external clause 
defining subset. Therefore the predicate memberA has one argument less than usual. 
As noticed above, a goal D 1 G with the semantics of closed blocks clearly 
corresponds to the metapredicate demo (“II”, “G”) defined within the object 
language. It must be mentioned that a first proposal for simulating demo in the 
object language has been presented by Gabbay and Reyle in [3,4], where two 
primitives suspend and restore are introduced to simulate demo in N-Prolog as 
follows: 
demo (“II”, “ G”) = suspend (D + G) restore, 
where + is the intuitionistic implication and suspend and restore are primitives 
which are used for suspending the data in the database (in order to compute D + G 
in the empty context) and then restoring the data back, respectively. These primitives 
are no longer needed if the semantics of the implication in goals is defined in a 
suitable way so as to provide closed blocks. 
This kind of semantics also makes implication goals suitable for supporting the 
introduction of module constructs in a logic language [6,7]. Since modules are 
intended to be used mainly for “programming in the large”, it seems reasonable to 
see them as closed environments (that is closed collections of clauses) with very 
limited and controlled communications with the external environment. 
2.2. Open blocks 
As a difference with closed blocks, blocks of conventional programming 
languages (hereafter called open blocks) allow local procedures to be defined in 
terms of other procedures occurring in externally nested blocks. In this way, the 
meaning of a block in a program turns out to be strictly dependent on its external 
environment. Therefore, open blocks seem to be a more adequate structuring tool 
for “programming in the small” rather than for defining a module facility. Open 
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blocks can be introduced in the language as a natural extension of closed blocks 
defined above by suitably modifying the semantics for the implication goal. 
A structured language with open blocks requires scope rules for locally defined 
clauses. Two alternatives are feasible as usual, namely static or dynamic scope rules. 
As far as variables are concerned, the use of explicit quantifiers allows us to give 
them static scope rules, as we have seen for closed blocks. We are now mainly 
concerned with scope rules for clauses. It is worth noticing that scope rules for 
clauses can be more complex than scope rules for procedures in conventional 
programming languages, because in a logic program a predicate definition is usually 
given by means of several clauses which can occur in different blocks. 
Visibility rules for local clause definitions depend on the semantics which is 
chosen for the implication goal. The operational semantics given to implication 
goals in the papers by Gabbay and Reyle, Miller and McCarty mentioned in the 
introduction is informally the following: A goal D = G can be solved in a program 
P if the goal G can be solved in the program P u D. For instance, to solve the goal 
a 1 b in the program {a + b}, we solve b in the program {a + 6, a}. This semantics 
is adequate for open blocks and also to support hypothetical reasoning, i.e. by 
assuming a and knowing a + b, we can deduce b. 
It is easy to see that dynamic scope rules are required by this semantics. Given 
the goal D 3 G to be proved in a program P, after the clauses in D have been added 
to the program P, they are no more distinguishable from other clauses of P and 
can be used in the subsequent refutation as global clauses. The added clauses are 
no more visible as soon as the proof of the goal G terminates (i.e. they are removed 
from the set of global clauses). Therefore, the set of clauses which can be used to 
solve a goal G depends on the sequence of goals generated till that moment in the 
proof containing G. Of course, this set can be determined only dynamically. 
Example 4. 
G=s 
P={r+q, 
The proof of the goal s in P yields 
goal (((q+pl A r) 1~) in p 
goal p in P’=Pu{q+p, r} 
goal q in P’ 
goal r in P’ 
which succeeds. The proof of the goal q uses the clause r defined in the inner block, 
which is visible at that point since the block has been added to the program l? If, 
on the contrary, the goal q is called directly from the outer environment its proof fails. 
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With this operational semantics, the implication D*G cannot be the classical 
one. If fact, in classical logic 
while, with the above operational semantics, the proof of the goal G = a from the 
program P = {(a 1 b) + a} fails. Gabbay and Reyle [3] have shown instead, that 
having a unique implication symbol 2 in goals and clauses, the interpretation of 
=) as the intuitionistic implication corresponds to the operational semantics above, 
and they have given the language a model-theoretic semantics based on “worlds”. 
Miller [ll] has given the language a fixpoint semantics for the same implication. 
2.3. Open blocks with static scope rules 
In this paper, on the contrary, we pursue the idea of defining a logic language 
with open blocks and static scope rules for clause definitions like those of conven- 
tional b- ck structured programming languages. As a difference with the proposal 
discussed above, we preserve the distinction between the implication in goals (2) 
and in clauses (-). The semantics of the implication + will be kept unaltered with 
respect to the semantics of the implication in Horn clause logic. Since scope rules 
are static, the set of clauses which can be used in the refutation of a goal depends 
only on the block structure of the program and can be statically determined. In this 
way to solve an atomic goal which comes from the body of a clause defined in a 
block, only the clauses defined in that block or in external enclosing blocks can be 
used. For instance, Example 4 would fail with static scope rules because the clause 
r, defined locally to the second clause of P, is not visible from the first clause of P 
On the contrary, the following example will succeed with static scope rules. 
Example 5. 
G=s 
P={q, 
(((rAs+P)Ar)~P)+sl. 
The goal G succeeds from the program P, since in this case r is used in the same 
block where it is defined and q is used from an inner block. 
This kind of open block appears to be a suitable extension of Horn clauses when 
used as a programming language. The choice of static scope rules is also justified 
from the implementation viewpoint, since they have the well-known advantages, to 
be discussed at the end of the paper, to allow more efficient implementations by 
allowing compilation of procedure calls. On the other hand, we remark that with 
our solution neither hypothetical reasoning nor dynamic program modification in 
general can be carried out. 
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As a final example of a program using blocks, let us consider the well-known 
logic program which implements the quicksort algorithm. First we present the usual 
Prolog implementation and then the corresponding implementation in the language 
we have defined so far. A Prolog-like notation like that of Example 2 will be 
employed in the example. 
Example 6. 
split(H, [AIX], [A( Y], 2) :- 
order(A, H), split(H, X, Y, Z). 
split(H, [A(X], Y, [AIZ]) :- 
order( H, A), split( H, X, Y, Z). 
split(-, [I, [I, [I). 
quicksort([ H ( T], S) :- 
split(H, T, A, B), 
quicksort( A, Al), 
quicksort( B, Bl), 
append(A1, [H(Bl], S). 
quicksort([ I, [I) 
order(A, H) :- . . . 
Since predicate split is used only by quicksort, we can move its definition inside 
the body of quicksort in an inner block declaration as follows: 
VH, T, S quicksort([ H 1 T], S) :- 
3A, B, Al, Bl 
({VA, X, Y, Z split([A]X], [Al Y], Z) :- 
order(A, H), split(X, Y, Z). 
VA, X, Y, Z split([AiX], Y, [AIZ] :- 
order( H, A), split(X, Y, Z). 
split0 I, [I, [ 1)) 1 split( T A, B)), 
quicksort(A, Al), 
quicksort( B, B l), 
append(A, [H 1 Sll, 9). 
wicksoN I, [I). 
VA, H order(A, H) :- * + * 
The scope of variable H is the whole clause defining quicksort; thus H can be used 
in the body of the split procedure as a global variable and must not be specified as 
a parameter of the split procedure itself (the procedure has now one parameter less 
than the previous definition). We have chosen to quantify variables used in the body 
of quicksort inside the body itself using an existential quantifier, whereas variables 
which are local to the definition of split are universally quantified in front of each 
clause of the procedure. Notice that it is not necessary to move the definition of 
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the predicate order inside the block in which split is defined. Nevertheless, order 
can be used by split since order is defined in an external enclosing block. If, on the 
contrary, closed blocks were used, the definition of order should be in the same 
block as that of split. 
3. The language and its operational semantics 
In this section we define a logic language which extends positive Horn clause 
logic by introducing open blocks with static scope rules. To describe the syntax and 
the operational semantics of this language we shall use the notation of [ll]. 
Let A, G and B be metalinguistic variables which represent atomic formulas, 
goals and definite clauses, respectively, and let T be a propositional constant (true). 
The syntax of the language is the following: 
G := T 1 A 1 G,AG> I3xG 1 DIG 
D := G+A 1 D,A D2 / VxD. 
A program is defined as a set of closed definite clauses. 
Notice that what we call clauses are actually not standard clauses, since they can 
be composed of a conjunction of clauses and the left-hand part of a clause G + A 
is allowed to contain implications. Notice also that a clause of the form T + A will 
be simply written as A. 
Given a program P and a closed goal G, we want now to define the meaning of 
G being operationally derivable from P, that is Pt G. In order to avoid problems 
with variable renaming and substitutions we follow [ 111 replacing universally quan- 
tified variables in a program with all their possible ground substitutions. Moreover, 
conjunctions of clauses are replaced by the corresponding set of clauses. The program 
which is obtained from P in such a way is denoted by [PI. [P] can be defined 
recursively as the smallest set of formulas such that 
(i) PL [PI; 
(ii) if D, A D, E [P] then D, E [P] and D, E [PI; 
(iii) if VxD E [P] then [x/t]D E [P] for all closed terms f. 
Let us consider first the case of closed blocks. With closed blocks, an implication 
goal simply specifies a context switch; thus, to prove a goal D 1 G in P we can 
simply prove G in D, forgetting everything about P since the clauses defined in 
externally nested blocks are visible neither from G not from D. In this case, the 
derivability of a closed goal G from a program P is defined by induction on the 
structure of G, by the following rules: 
(1’) PET; 
(2’) if A is a closed atomic formula, Pt A iff there is a formula G + A E [P] and 
(3’) PEG, A G2 iff PEG, and PEG,; 
(4’) Pt3xG iff there is some closed term t such that Pt[x/t]G; 
(5’) PFDIG iff Di-G. 
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Let us turn to open blocks. As a difference with closed blocks, open blocks allow 
the external environment to remain visible when entering a block. With dynamic 
scope rules the union of clauses in P and Di is considered for each goal Di 2 Gi, 
so that local definitions are no more distinguishable from global ones. In this case, 
the operational semantics (as defined for instance in [ll]) can be obtained from 
the semantics defined above by replacing rule (5’) with the rule 
PtD>G iff PuDtG. 
From now on we shall consider open blocks with static scope rules. In this case 
in order to define an operational semantics for the language, we have to consider 
lists ofprograms of the form P, 1. . .I P, instead of simply programs. In a list P, 1. . .I P,,, 
P, is the initial program while each Pz, for i> 1, is the conjunction of clauses 
contained in the D, of a block D, 3 G,. The higher the index i, the deeper the nesting 
of the block Di 1 Gi. Thus the list P, 1. . .( P,, represents the static nesting of blocks 
in a program P, at some step of the derivation of a goal G from l? 
We define the derivability of a closed goal G from a nonempty list of programs 
P, 1. . .I P,, by induction on the structure of G, by the following rules: 
(1) P,)-.IP,u-T; 
(2) if A is a closed atomic formula, P, 1. . .I P, F A iff, for some i, 1 -S id n, there 
is a formula G + A E [Pi] and P, 1. . .I P, t G; 
(3) P,(*..IP,,~G,AG~~~~ P,I...IP,,tG, and P,I...IP,tGz; 
(4) P, 1. . .I P,, i- 3xG iff there is some closed term t such that P, 1. . .I P,, F [xl t]G; 
(5) P,~.../P,,FDIG~B P,I...IP,ID+G. 
Consider first rule (2): when a clause G+ A in P, is used to refute an atomic 
goal A, then the clauses in P,+, , . . . , P,, cannot be used any more to prove G. This 
is because the blocks corresponding to P,,, , . . , P, do not contain the block from 
which G is called and therefore are not visible from G. As we can see from rule 
(5), when the goal is a block D 2 G, the set of local clause definitions D is added 
to the list of programs as the tail element and G is proved from the resulting list 
of programs. Thus the clauses in D can be used only to refute goals which come 
from D itself or from G. 
Notice that, in our proposal, the clauses that define a predicate p can occur in 
different blocks of a program and a matching clause for p is selected nondeterministi- 
tally from the list of programs P, , . . . , P, (rule (2)). Differently from conventional 
structured programming languages and from the proposal of Monteiro and Porto 
[14] no overriding of predicate definitions applies when entering a new block. 
It is important to notice the different usage and meaning of the two implications, 
+ and 1, have in the language with open blocks and static scope rules. In particular, 
we point out that p + q b~p = q. 
A derivation of G from a nonempty list of programs P, 1. . .I P, is defined as a 
finite sequence of pairs ( W, , G,), . . . , (W,,,,G,,), where W,=P,I*..IP,,, G,=G, 
G,=Tand,fori=l,..., m, W, t Gi. The derivability of G, from W, can be obtained 
from the pairs of the sequence which follow ( W,, G,) using the above rules (how 
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many members of the sequence must be considered depends on the rule which is 
applied). 
Example 7. Let us consider the program P of Example 5. The following is a derivation 
of a the goal G = s from P: 
G,=s, W,=P,={T+q, (((rr\qjp)r\(T~r))~p)~s}, 
GZ=((rAq~p)/\(T~r))~p, W>=P, by rule (2), 
Gj=p, W,=P,IP,, P2=(rAq+p)A(T+r) by rule (5), 
G, = r A q, W, = P, 1 Pz by rule (2), 
G5 = 9, W, = P, 1 Pz by rule (3), 
G6=T, W,=P, by rule (2), 
G, = r, W, = P, 1 P2 by rule (3) 
applied to (G4, W,), 
G8 = T, W, = P, 1 Pz by rule (2). 
If the first clause of P is replaced by r + q, then the derivation of G = s from P is 
no longer feasible. In fact, in this case we have: G6 = r, W, = P, , and P, does not 
contain the definition of r, which is defined in the inner block Pz and, therefore, 
not visible at this point. 
In the next sections we shall present the fixpoint and model-theoretic semantics 
for our language and we shall prove the equivalence between the operational 
semantics and the fixpoint semantics and between the fixpoint and the model- 
theoretic semantics. All these semantics are defined by extending the corresponding 
standard semantics given for positive Horn clause logic (see [l, 81). 
4. Fixpoint semantics 
Given a program P, let U(P) be the Herbrand universe for P, that is the set of 
all ground terms that can be formed out of the constant and functional symbols 
occurring in P. In the case P does not contain any constant, we add some constant, 
say c, to form ground terms. Let B(P) be the Herbrand base for P, that is, the set 
of all ground atoms which can be formed by using predicates of P and terms in 
U(P). An Herbrand interpretation for P is a subset of B(P). The set of all Herbrand 
interpretations for P (the power set of B(P)) is a complete lattice under inclusion, 
with B(P) as the top element and 0 as the bottom element. 
In the case of Horn clause logic, the fixpoint semantics of a program P can be 
obtained by defining a mapping Tp from the lattice of Herbrand interpretations to 
itself (called the “immediate consequences” transformation) and by proving it to 
be monotone and continuous; then the semantics of P is the least fixpoint of Tp. 
In the case of the language with open blocks, a program P (i.e., a set of clauses) 
can be regarded also a a block inside a larger program. In this case, P must be 
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considered as an open context whose meaning may depend on its external environ- 
ment, namely on the content of externally nested blocks. As a consequence, we 
replace the TP of the standard case with a mapping TP,, where I is an Herbrand 
interpretation which is intended to convey all the necessary information about the 
enclosing environment of the program P More precisely, I is the set of the ground 
atomic formulas on the Herbrand Universe that are derivable from the external 
environment. 
The mapping T,, is defined as follows: 
Tp,,(X)= Iu{AEB(P): there is a G+Ae[P] and X>G}, 
where X is an Herbrand interpretation for P and t is the weak relation of 
sat&liability between Herbrand interpretations and closed goals and is defined as 
follows: 
l X>T, 
l X>AiffAEX, 
l XzG,AGziIIX>G,andX>G,, 
l X>3xG iff X>[x/t]G for some TV U(P), 
l X > D 1 G iff Tz,x(0) > G, where T”,,,(0) = iJF=, T:,,(0). 
Tp,, is well-defined although its definition seems to be circular. In fact, Tp,, is 
defined by induction on the number n of nestings of 1 in P. When n = 0, the case 
G = D 2 G’ does not occur in the definition of > and, therefore, Tp,[ is well-defined 
for n =O. For n>O, T”,,,(0) is used in the definition of Tp,,. However, since D 
contains at most n - 1 levels of nesting of 2, T D,x is defined. Furthermore, since 
for every k 2 0, T:,,(0) E 2R’P’, and since 2 *(‘) is a complete lattice, the least upper 
bound T”,,,(0) does exist. 
It can be proved (see Appendix A). that T p,, is monotone and continuous, and 
therefore that it has a least fixpoint lfp( T,>,,) = UT=‘=, T:,,(O) (T;,(0) for short). The 
semantics of a program P, in this case, is a mapping from an interpretation I (a 
subset of B(P)) to another interpretation, namely the least fixpoint of Tp,,, T?,,(0). 
Notice that the mapping Tp,, can clearly be defined in terms of Tp as follows: 
TP,,(W = 1 u TP(X). 
However, we have the following inequality: 
T:,(O) Z 1 u T:(0). 
We can consider such an interpretation Z as an environment which associates 
with each predicate symbol in the program a denotation, that is, the set of tuples 
of terms for which the predicate is true. Hence, the semantics of a program P turns 
out to be defined as a mapping from an environment 1, consisting of the set of 
ground atoms true in the external context, to another environment, the least fixpoint 
of TP.,, consisting of the set of atoms I plus the atoms derivable from I using P. 
Thus, there is an immediate parallel with standard programming languages, whose 
denotational semantics is defined as a mapping between environments. 
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We shall prove that T:*(0) is the set of all ground atomic formulas operationally 
derivable from P, and, more generally, by using the relation of weak satisfiability, that 
TTM(0) > G iff PF G, 
namely, that the fixpoint semantics is equivalent to the operational semantics. To 
prove this equivalence, we separately prove soundness and completeness of the 
operational semantics with respect to the fixpoint semantics. 
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let P be a program and G be a closed goal. Then 
PFG + T&(@)>G. 
Proof. If Pt G then there is a derivation ( W,, G,), . . . , ( W,, G,), where W, = P, 
G, = G and G, = T. We prove by induction on k < n that if W,_, = P, 1. . .) P, for 
some m, then T? ,,,, Y,,,_, (0)>G,_,,where Y,=0and Yj= TF1,,/_,(0).Thusfork=n-1 
we have that T:‘(0) > G. 
If k = 0 the thesis holds trivially. 
We assume that the thesis holds for i < k and we prove it for i = k considering 
all possible cases for G (double induction). 
l If Gnmk = T, the thesis obviously holds. 
l If Gn-k = A then, for some js m, there is a G + A E [!,I and, for some h < k, 
G+,, = G and W,_, = P, 1. * .I P,. By inductive hypothesis, TF,y,_l(0) > G. So, by 
definition of Tp,, y,_, , 
Moreover, for all j, Y, c TF,l,y,(0) = Y,,, and therefore, since j d m, 
Thus AE T:,,,,,,-,(0). 
l If GnPk = G, A G2 then there are two nonnegative integers h, j< k such that 
GA = G,, G,_, = G, and W,_, = W,_, = W,_,. By inductive hypothesis, 
TF?,, y,,, -I (0) > G, and C,,r,y,,z-,(0) > G. Thus TFl,,,-,(B) z=- G A G. 
l If Gn_k = 3xG’ we proceed as in the previous case. 
l If Gnmk = D 2 G’ then, for some j < k, G,-, = G’ and W,,,, = P, 1. . .I P, 1 D. By 
inductive hypothesis, T”,, v,,, (0) > G’, that is Y,,, > D 1 G’. Thus, by definition of 
Ym 3 T:,,l, y,,, ,(0)> DxG’. 0 
To prove the completeness of the operational semantics with respect to the fixpoint 
semantics, we shall make use of the following lemmas. I* denotes the set {T + A: A E 
I}, where I is a subset of B(P). 
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Lemma 1. LetI,sI,cI,G... be a sequence of Herbrand interpretations. If G is a 
goal and Uy=,, Z, > G then there exists k > 0 such that Ik > G. 
Lemma 2. Let D, and D2 be programs, G a closed goal and W a list of programs 
(possibly empty). Zf D, z D, then 
D,I WtG + D21 WFG. 
Lemma 3. Let P be a program, G a closed goal, I a subset of B(P) and W a list of 
programs (possibly empty). Then 
I*uPI WtG j I*IPj WtG. 
Lemma 4. Let P be a program, G a closed goal. Then 
{T+A:PEA}FG j PtG. 
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix A. Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 can be proved by double 
induction on the length of the derivation and on the structure of the goal G. 
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Let P be a program, G a closed goal, I a subset of B(P). 
Then 
T;,(O)> G + Pu I*+G. 
Proof. It suffices to prove (by induction on the highest number n of levels of nesting 
of + in P and G) that for every k 2 0, 
T;,,(@>G j PuZ*tG. (*) 
In fact, if T:,(0) > G then, by Lemma 1, there is a ks0 such that T!,,(0)> G. 
Therefore, we can conclude by (*) that P u I* I- G. 
If n = 0 then there are no occurrences of 3 neither in P nor in G. (*) can be 
easily proved by double induction on k and on the structure of G. 
Let us consider in detail the case n > 0. We assume, by inductive hypothesis, that 
(*) holds for at most n - 1 levels of nesting of 2 in P and G. Again we prove that 
it holds for n by double induction on k and on the structure of G. 
(a) Let us assume k = 0. 
l If G = T then (*) obviously holds. 
l If G = A the A is not in T:,,(0) = 0. 
l If G = G, A G2 then 
T!,,(B) > G, A G j T’&(0) > G, and Z%(0) > G 
=+ Pu I*FG, and Pu I*+G, 
(by inductive hypothesis since G, and G2 are substructures of G) 
j Pul*kGI~GZ. 
l If G = 3xG’ we proceed in a way similar to the previous case. 
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l If G = D 2 G’, then 
T;,,(B) > D 2 G’ + T$,(O) > G’, since T:.,(O) = 0 
* &,(0) > G’, for some h 2 0 (by Lemma 1) 
=+ Du0”+G’, (by inductive hypothesis, 
since D and G’ can contain at 
most n - 1 levels of nesting of 1) 
=+ DtG’ 
+ OFDIG’ 
=2 Pu I*+ D 3 G’ (by Lemma 2). 
(b) For k > 0 we assume, by inductive hypothesis, that (*) holds for k - 1. 
l IfG=TorG=G,r\G,orG=YxG’weproceedasinthecasek=O. 
l If G = A then AE T:,,(0), so either AE I, or there is a G+AE [P] such that 
T;;‘(0) > G. In the first case, T+ A E I” c P u I” and therefore P u Z*t A. In 
the second one, since (*) holds for k - 1, we have, by inductive hypothesis, that 
Pu I*FG; thus Pu I*tA. 
l If G = D 1 G’, then 
T:,,(B) > D 2 G’ 3 T”,,,(B) > G’, where X = T:,,(0) 
=+ T;,,(Q) > G’, for some h 2 0 (by Lemma 1) 
+ DuX*tG’ (by inductive hypothesis, 
since D and G’ can contain at 
most n - 1 levels of nesting of 1) 
+ X*ID+G’ (by Lemma 3) 
+ X*FDIG’ 
* U-“p,,(0))*+ D 3 G’ 
=a {T-A: PuI*tA}tD~G’ 
(by Lemma 2, since 
-see step G = A- 
AE T:,,(0) implies Pu I*tA 
and hence 
T;,,(0)g{A: PuZ*tA}) 
+ Pu Z”k D+G’(by Lemma 4). 0 
From Theorems 1 and 2, for I = 0, we have TF,,,,,,, > G iff Pt G; that is, the 
operational semantics is sound and complete with respect to the fixpoint semantics. 
As a particular case, for G = A 
AE T;@(0) iff PtA; 
that is, 
T;d0) = {A: P+A}. 
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As an example, let us consider once again the program P of Example 5. We want 
to determine whether G = s can be derived from P, that is, whether s E T&(g). 
Example 8. 
&l(0) = (41, T&(0) = Tfd{ql) = (4, sl, 
c%4(0) = TP,M({% sl) = (4, s> = lfP(TQJ. 
Notice that to determine whether s belongs to TP.M(X) it is necessary to determine 
whether T”,,,(B) > p with D = (q A r + p) A ( T + r) (fifth rule of the definition of >). 
For X =0 we have lfp( Tn.x) = {r} so that p is not satisfied in T;,,(O). On the 
contrary, for X = {q} we have lfp( T,,,) = {q, r, p} so that p is satisfied in T&(eJ) 
and SE T”p,,,(0). 
Finally notice that if we replace the first clause of P with the clause r+ q, the 
goal G = s is not satisfiable anymore by P since in this case T:@(g) = 0. 
5. Model-theoretic semantics 
In this section we define a model-theoretic semantics for the language with open 
blocks and we prove soundness and completeness of the fixpoint semantics with 
respect to the model-theoretic semantics. 
We now want to define the satisfiability of a formula (Y in a given Herbrand 
interpretation Z (i.e., I k a), where (Y can be either a goal formula or a clause. 
Satisfiability can be defined as usual in classical logic, the only exception being the 
definition of satisfiability for implication goals. To understand the intuitive meaning 
of the semantics for implication goals, let us start considering the case of closed 
blocks. With closed blocks, an implication D 1 G has the natural meaning “G is a 
logical consequence of D”. Therefore, the definition of satisfiability for the implica- 
tion goal is rather obvious, 
Z + D 1 G iff for all interpretations I’, Z’l= Da I’/= G; 
that is, the satisfiability of D 1 G does not depend on the interpretation 1. In the 
case of open blocks, on the contrary, the content of the interpretation Z is not 
negligible and we can think of the interpretation Z as giving information about what 
is true in the external environment, that is, in the enclosing blocks. Since what is 
true in the external environment still remains true when entering a new block, we 
verify the satisfiability of an implication goal D 2 G by considering all the interpreta- 
tions which are supersets of Z and testing in each of them whether G is true when 
D is true. 
Let us define more formally the model-theoretic semantics for open blocks. Let 
(Y be a closed formula of the language defined in Section 3, that is, a goal or a 
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definite clause. Given an Herbrand interpretation I for (Y we define I b (Y (I satis$es 
cr) by induction on the structure of (Y as follows: 
. r+T, 
l Zt=A ifi AE I, 
l IkG,r\G2 iff I@G, and IbGGz, 
l 1+3xG iff I+=[x/t]G for some TV U(a), 
l IF D 2 G iff, for all interpretations I’, (I G I’ and I’+ D)+I’l= G, 
l II=G+A iff ZkG=+lbA, 
l IkVxD iff Ik[x/t]D for all TV U(a), 
0 Il=DD,AD,iffZ+D,andI+D,. 
Let P be a program and I an Herbrand interpretation for P. I satisfies P( I I= P), 
that is, I is a model for P if I satisfies all clauses in P. Let us denote by M(P) the 
set of all the Herbrand models of l? A closed goal formula G is a logical consequence 
of P (Pk G) iff, for all interpretations I of P, I I= P=3I b G. Notice that, from the 
definition of [P] given in Section 3, it follows that I + P iff for all G+ A E [PI, 
Ik=G-+A. 
It must be noticed that the two different implications + and 2 have been given 
different semantics. The implication + is the classical one, while the implication 1 
has a semantics similar to that of the implication of intuitionistic logic. Our model- 
theoretic semantics is, nevetheless, simpler than Kripke semantics for intuitionistic 
logic (see Section 6), since an Herbrand interpretation is defined to be a subset of 
the Herbrand base as in classical logic; we do not need to introduce the notion 
of worlds as in Kripke interpretations. From another point of view, as we shall 
see in the next section, this semantics can be considered as a Kripke semantics 
in which only a subset of the Kripke interpretations has to be taken into account. 
As a result, for every program P, there exists a least Herbrand model of P and 
this gives us the possibility to prove the equivalence between the model-theoretic 
and fixpoint semantics in the same way as it has been done for Horn clause 
logic in [l]. 
Example 9. Let us consider again the program P of Example 5: 
Z = {q, s} is a model of P, since I satisfies both of the two clauses in P. In fact, I + q 
and, since IFS, then Ib(D~p)+s, where D=((r~q+p)~r). Moreover, it can 
be proved that 1 is a minimal model of P, since neither Ii = $4 nor Z, = {q} nor I, = {s} 
are models of P. In fact, I, and I3 do not satisfy the first clause of Z’, while I2 does 
not satisfy the second one. To prove this, notice that 12#s, but for every superset 
I’ of 1,, if I’k D then I’+ p. This obviously holds when p E I’; the other possible 
cases are the following ones: 
I’={q, s}#D, I’={q, r}#D, I’= {q, s, r}# D. 
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Hence, I is the minimal model of P since P has a minimal model by the intersection 
property below. Therefore, G = s is a logical consequence of I? On the contrary, 
I = 0 is a model of the program P of Example 4. In fact, 
0+r-+q, 0+((4+p)Ar)~p)-fs. 
Indeed, 0 # ((q + p) A r) 13 p) since there is a superset {r} of 0 such that {r} k (q + r) A r 
but {r}#p. Therefore I = Sl= P but I # s, so that s is not a logical consequence of P. 
To prove the equivalence between fixpoint and model-theoretic semantics, we 
establish some lemmas first. 
Lemma 5. Let P be a program, G a closed goal and I, and I2 two Herbrand interpreta- 
tions for P. If I, n I2 k G, then I, k G and I2 k= G. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of G. 
l If G = T, it is obvious. 
l If G=A, then 
I,n I,l=A =+ AE I,n12 
3 AEI, andAE12 
=3 I,kA and I,kA. 
l If G=G,r,G,, then 
I,nIzkG,~G2 + I,nI,kG, and I,n12kGz 
+ I, k G,, I,+ G,, I, k G2, I,+ G, (by ind. hypothesis) 
+ I,kG,r\G,and 12!=G,~Gz. 
l If G = 3xG’, then 
I, n I>/= 3xG’ + I, n I,+ [ t/x]G’ for some closed term t 
+ I,l=[t/x]G’and I,/=[t/x]G’ for some closed term t 
(by ind. hypothesis) 
=3 I, k 3xG’ and I,+ 3xG’. 
l If G = D 3 G’, then 
I,n I,kDxG 3 for all l’(I,nZ,rZ’and I’l=D)JI’kG’. 
Since I, n I2 s I,, we have that for all I’ 
(I,s I’and I’l=D) + Z’kG’, 
i.e., I, k D 2 G’. Similarly, I,+ D 3 G’. 0 
Lemma 6 (Model intersection property). Let P be a program and I, and I2 two 
Herbrand interpretations for P. If I, and I, are models of P, then I, n I2 is a model 
of P. 
Extending Horn clause logic with implication goals 61 
Proof. It can be proved by induction on D that, for every clause D in P, I, k D 
and Z21=D~Z,nZ,kD. 
l If D=G+A, then 
Z,kG+A and I,kG+A =3 Z,kG j Z,kA and l,kG + 12kA. 
If we assume that I, n Z,k G, we have, by Lemma 5, I, k G and I,+ G. Thus 
Z, k A and Izk A, that is, I, n Z, k A. Therefore, I, n Z, b G + A. 
l If D = VxD’ then 
Z,kVxD’and Z,kVxD’ =2 Z,i=[x/t]D’and Z,b[x/t]D’ forall DEB 
+ Z,nZ2k[x/f]D’ for all DEB 
(by inductive hypothesis) 
+ I, n I2 k VxD’. 
0 If D = D, A D2 then 
Z,kD,r,D,and Z,I=D,AD~ =3 Z,kD,, Z,kDz, Z2i=D, and Z2kD2 
+ I, n I,+ D, and I, n Z21== D, 
(by inductive hypothesis) 
=+ Z,nZ,kD,r\D,. 0 
As a consequence of Lemma 6 we have that the intersection nM(Z’) of all 
Herbrand models of P is a model of P, namely the least Herbrand model of P. 
Lemma 7. nM( P) = {A: Pt= A}. 
Proof. 
P!=A iff for all Z, Zk=P+Zk=A 
iff for all Z, I k P*A E Z 
iff for all Z, ZEM(P)JAEZ, since M(P)={Z: ZkP} 
iff AEnM(P) 0 
We now prove soundness and completeness of the fixpoint semantics with respect 
to the model-theoretic semantics. 
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness). Let P be a program, G a closed goal and 
IasubsetofB(P)(rememberthatI*={T+A,A~Z}). Then 
T:,(P))> G ifs nM(Pu Z*)l= G. 
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Proof. Let Z and X be two Herbrand interpretations. We shall prove that 
X>G ilI XkG (I) 
and 
Z E X and X E M(P) iff Tp,(X) c X. 
From (2) it is easy to prove that 
T;,(B) = nM(PU Z”). 
In fact, 
(2) 
(3) 
z-;,(B) = f-xX: T-P,,(X) 5 X> 
=n{X: XEM(P) and ZcX} by (3), 
=n{X: X E M(P) and Xk I*} 
=n{X: XkZkZ*j 
= nM(Pu I*). 
From (1) and (3) the thesis can be immediately derived. 
Let us prove (1) and (2) by induction on the highest number n of levels of nesting 
of 1 in P and G. 
(a) If n = 0 then there are no occurrences of 2 neither in P nor in G. (1) can be 
easily proved by induction on the structure of G. 
l If G = T, it is obvious. 
l If G=A,X>A iff AEX iff XkA. 
l If G=G,t,G,, 
X>G,r,G2 ifI X>G, and X>Gz 
iff X k G, and X k Gz (by inductive hypothesis) 
iff Xk=G,r\ Gz. 
l If G = 3xG’, the proof is similar. 
The case G = D 2 G’ does not occur, since n = 0. 
We shall prove that (2) holds for n = 0. 
(From left o right): Let us assume that Z G X and X E M(P). We want to show 
that Tp,[ (X) G X. If A E Tp,, (X) then either A E Z and then A E X, or there is a 
G + A E [P] such that X > G. G does not contain any occurrence of 2, therefore 
X > G implies X k G. Since, in addition, X E M(P), that is, for all G + A E [PI, 
X b G implies X k A, we have that X k A. Thus A E X. 
(From right to left): Let us assume that T:,,(X) c X. We want to prove that Z s X 
and X E M(P). 
Tp,,(X)s X + for all A, AE Tp.,(X) implies AE X 
+ for all A, (A E Z or there is G + A E [P] such that X z G) 
implies A E X. 
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Thus for all A in I, A E I implies A E X, that is, I c X; and if there exists a G + A E [P] 
such that X > G then A E X. Since X z G if X k G, we have that, for all G + A E [PI, 
if X k G then AE X, that is, X E M(P). Thus we have proved (2). 
(b) If n > 0 we assume, by inductive hypothesis, that (1) and (2) (and thus the 
thesis, by the argument above) hold for at most n - 1 levels of nesting of 3 in P 
and G. We prove that (1) and (2) hold for n levels of nesting. Again, (1) is proved 
by induction on the structure of G. 
l IfG=TorG=AorG=G,r\G,orG=3xG’weproceedasinthecasen=O. 
. If G=DzG’, 
X > D 1 G’ iff T”,,,(0) > G’ 
iff n M(D u X*) k G’ (by D and 
G’ can contain at most n - 1 levels 
of nesting of 2 and thus (l), (2) and 
the thesis hold for D and G’) 
iff for all I, IEM(DuX*)JI+G’ 
iff for all I. II= DuX*+Ib G’ 
iff for all I, Xs I and I+ D+Zk G’ 
(2) is proved as for n = 0 by showing that (3) holds. In doing this, we use the fact 
that each formula in P contains at most n levels of nesting of 3 and that (1) holds 
for n. 0 
From Theorem 3, for I = 0, we have 
T&,(0) > G iff nA4( P)I= G. 
Since 
nA4(P)k=G iff for all I, I E M(P)+ZkG 
(by Lemma 5 and since nM(P) E M(P)) 
iff for all I, Zl=P*Zl=G 
iff Pl=G, 
the following relation holds: 
T&(0) z G iff PI= G, 
that is, the fixpoint semantics is sound and complete with respect to the model- 
theoretic semantics. 
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6. An alternative model-theoretic semantics based on Kripke interpretations 
In the last section we have defined the model-theoretic semantics of our language 
by employing Herbrand interpretations defined as subsets of the Herbrand base. 
We shall now define another model-theoretic semantics for the language, by making 
use of Kripke interpretations. Again we consider only interpretations defined on the 
Herbrand universe. The satisfiability relation is defined in the same way as in positive 
intuitionistic logic, with an extension due to the presence of the two different kinds 
of implication. 
Let (Y be a closed formula, that is a goal or a definite clause. A Kripke interpretation 
M for (Y is a triple ( W, C, I,,), where W s 2 B(u) is a partially ordered set of worlds 
and I, E W is a world of M such that 10~ I, for any world I of M (i.e. I, is the 
least world). We define the satisfiability relation between an interpretation M and 
a formula cy in a given world I of M by induction on the structure of LY, as follows: 
. M+,T, 
l Mb=,Aiff AEI, 
l M+,G,AG~~~I Ml=,G, and M+,G*, 
l Mb, 3xG iff M +, [x/t]G for some tE U(a), 
l Ml=,D~Giff,foreachworld I’ofM,(IcZ’and Mi=,,D)*M+,,G, 
l M b,G-+A iff M +,G=+M +,A, 
l Mb, VxD iff M +, [x/t]D for all te U(a), 
l Mb,D,~D?iff Mb=,D, and Ml=,D?. 
An interpretation M = ( W, S, lo) satisfies a formula (Y iff M + ,, a. Let P be a 
program and M a Kripke interpretation for P. M satisfies P, if M satisfies all the 
clauses in P. Let G be a closed goal formula. G is a logical consequence of P(P +’ G) 
iff, for all Kripke interpretations M for P, M I=,,, Pa M I=,,, G (we use a prime to 
distinguish between logical consequence in the two different model-theoretic 
semantics). 
Notice that if we restrict the language to the propositional case and have a unique 
implication symbol (used both in goals and in clauses) with the semantics of 1, 
this semantics is the same (with a change of notation) as that presented in [4], 
which is the semantics of intuitionistic logic. On the other hand, if we restrict the 
language by eliminating blocks and so the implication 3, we have clearly a semantics 
for classical logic (only the least interpretation in a world is used). At a semantic 
level we can therefore consider 3 to be the intuitionistic implication, while + is 
the classical one. However, if the two implications are considered altogether, the 
resulting semantics differs from that of both intuitionistic and classical logic. Indeed, 
the very weak logical equivalence 
which is held by intuitionistic and classical logic, is not satisfied by 3 (more precisely, 
the equivalence is satisfied if clauses in D, and D2 are all of the form T+ A, but 
not in the general case). 
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This model-theoretic semantics is not equivalent to that of the previous section 
in the general case. For example, 
aIb+b and aIb#‘b, 
In fact, every interpretation I that satisfies a 1 b must satisfy b too, because, 
otherwise, there is an interpretation I’ = I u {a} reachable from 1 which satisfies a 
but not b (against the definition of satisfiability for an implication goal). On the 
other hand, there are Kripke interpretations which satisfy a 2 b in their initial world 
but do not satisfy 6, such as, for instance, the interpretation M = ({I,, I,}, s, I,), 
where I,, = B and I, = {b}. Nevertheless, if we restrict ourselves to determine whether 
a goal is a logical consequence of a program in our language, the two semantics are 
equivalent. In fact, it can be proved that, given a program P and a closed goal G, 
Pi=‘G iff P+G. (**) 
In the example above this restriction is not satisfied since a 2 b is not a program 
in our language; so the equivalence (**) does not hold in this case. 
To prcve (**) we establish the following lemmas first. 
Lemma 8. Let cy be a ,formula (that is, a goal or a definite clause), I,, a subset of 
B(a) and M the Kripke interpretation ( W, s, I,), where W = (1’: 1’~ 2R’“’ and Z,,C I’}. 
Then,foralll~W,lI=cuiffM~,cw. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of the formula CY. 
l If LY = T, it is obvious. 
l If a=A, then l+A iff AEl iff Mb,,. 
l Ifcu=G,AG,,then 
ZFG,AG~ iff l+G, and l+Gz 
ifi M b, G, and M +, Gz (by inductive hypothesis) 
iff Ml=,G,r\Gz. 
l If LY = 3xG or CY = D, A D2 or (Y = VxD we proceed as in the previous case. 
l If a = D 1 G, we have to prove that, for all I’, (1 s 1’ and Z’F D)Jl’I= G iff, 
for all worlds 1’ of M, (1 c 1’ and M I=,, D)+ M E,, G. 
From left to right, for any I’E W such that I s I’, 
M+,,D =+ I’+ D (by inductive hypothesis since 1’~ W) 
*l’I=G (since the left part of the equivalence holds) 
+ M +,, G (by inductive hypothesis). 
From right to left, for any 1’ such that I c 1’ (clearly, I’E W since IO G IL I’), 
l’l= D 3 M +,, D (by inductive hypothesis) 
* M I=,, G (since the right part of the equivalence holds) 
+ I’+ G (by inductive hypothesis) 
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l If LY = D+ G, we have to prove that 
II=DDjZI=G iff MI=,D+Mb,G. 
From left to right, 
M+,D + Zi=D (by inductive hypothesis) 
j ZkG (since the left part of the equivalence holds) 
+ M +, G (by inductive hypothesis). 
From right to left, 
Z k D j M I= I D (by inductive hypothesis) 
+ M +, G (since the right part of the equivalence holds) 
+ ZkG (by inductive hypothesis). 0 
Lemma 9. Let D be a dejinite clause, G a closed goal (we assume that G contains 
only nonlogical symbols that occur in D), Z, and Z subsets of B(D) and M the Kripke 
interpretation ( W, C, I,), with W c 2B’D’ and Z E W. Then 
(1) Zl= GJM+~G, 
(2) I# D+M#,D. 
Proof. By induction on the number n of levels of nesting of 2 in D and G. 
(a) If n = 0 we prove (1) by structural induction on G and (2) by structural 
induction on D. To prove (l), we proceed as follows: 
l If G = T, it is obvious. 
0 If G=A,then ZI=AAAAZIMM~A. 
l If G=G,AG*, then 
ZkG,r\G2 + ZkG, and ZkG2 
+ M +, G, and M +, GZ (by inductive hypothesis) 
=+ MF,G,r\G2. 
l If G = 3xG’, we proceed as in the previous case. 
To prove (2), we will prove (by contraposition) M +, D-Z I= D. 
l If D=G+A, by assuming M+,G +A, that is M b,G=+M +,A, we have 
I+ G + M +,G (since (1) holds for n=O) 
+ M i=, A (by the previous assumption) 
j AEZ 
thus Zk G+A. 
Extending Horn clause logic with implication goals 67 
l If D = D, A D2 or D = VxD’, it is obvious by induction. 
(b) Now we consider the case n > 0. We assume, by inductive hypothesis, that 
(1) and (2) hold for at most n - 1 levels of nesting of 2 in G and D. First we shall 
prove that (1) holds by induction on the structure of G. 
l IfG=TorG=AorG=G,~GzorG=3xG’,theproofisthesameasforn=0. 
l If G = D 2 G’, then by assuming I k D 1 G’ (that is, for all I’ such that Z z I’, 
I’!= D+Z’l= G), we have, for all Z’E W such that Z z I’, 
Mk,,D + Z’l= D (by inductive hypothesis) 
=+ Z’kGG’ (by the previous assumption) 
+ Mk,G’ (by inductive hypothesis), 
that is, M k, D 3 G’. 
To prove (2) we prove (by contraposition) M k, D+Z k D, by induction on the 
structure of D. 
l If D = D, A D2 or D = VxD’, the proof is the same as in the case n = 0. 
l If D=G-+A,byassuming MI=,G +A, that is M k,GJM +,A, we have 
Z i= G 3 M k, G (since (1) holds for n) 
3 M k, A (by the previous assumption) 
+ AE~ 
3 ZkA, 
thus ZI=G+A. 0 
Since a program is a set of closed definite clauses, if Z # P then there is a clause 
D such that Z # D and, by Lemma 9, we have that M #, D. Thus M #, P. Therefore, 
the relation (2) of Lemma 5 holds for any program P, not only for any definite 
clause D. 
Theorem 4. Let P be a program and G be a goal. Then Pk’G iff Pk G. 
Proof. (From left to right): By hypothesis, for all the interpretations M, M k,,, P+ 
M k,,, G. We want to prove that for all the interpretations Z, Z k PJZ k G. Let Z 
be an interpretation such that Z k Z? By Lemma 8, M k, P, where M is the interpreta- 
tion (W, G, I) and W={Z: Z’E~~‘~’ and Z s I’}. Thus, by hypothesis, M k, G and, 
again by Lemma 8, Z k G. 
(From right to left): By hypothesis, for all the interpretations Z, I+ P+ZI= G. 
We want to prove that, for all the interpretations M, M I= ,,] Pa M + ,,, G. Given an 
interpretation M = ( W, C, I,), there are two possible cases for I,: either Z,,l= G or 
I,) # Z? If I,,!= G then, by Lemma 9, M k ,,, G; if Z,,itL P, then, by Lemma 9, M # ,” P. 
Thus we have that either M k,,, G or M if,,, P, namely M k,,, P=3 M k,,, G. 0 
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7. Towards a concrete implementation 
The definition of the operational semantics given in Section 3 is very simple since, 
given a program P, it introduces the set [P] of all ground instances of the clauses 
in P and does not involve the notions of substitution, unification and variable 
renaming. We shall now present a less abstract operational semantics for the language 
with open blocks, which is clearly equivalent to the previous one and is defined 
using substitutions, unification and variable renaming. 
Let P, 1. . .I P,, be a nonempty list of programs, let G be a closed goal and let 0 
be a substitution. We define derivability of G from the list P, 1. . ./ P,,, with substitution 
0 by induction on the structure of G in the following way: 
(1) P,(-.IP&T with substitution I (identity substitution); 
(2) if A is a closed atomic formula, P, 1. . .I P,, F A with substitution 0 iff for some 
is n there is a formula Vx, . . VxkG + BE Pi such that p = mgu(A, B’) and 
P,p 1. . .I Pip t G’p with substitution 4 and 0 = ~4, where G’+ B’ is the clause 
obtained by renaming the universally quantified variables x, , . . , xk; 
(3) PI 1. . .I P,, t G, A G2 with substitution 8 iff P, 1. . .I P, t G, with substitution 4 
and P,4 1. . .I P,,q5 E G24 with substitution p and 0 = 4~; 
(4) P, 1. . .I P,, ~-3xG with substitution 0 iff P, 1. . .I P,, F G’ with substitution 0, 
where G’ is obtained from G by renaming x; 
(5) P, 1. . .I P,, F D 1 G with substitution 0 iff P, 1. . .I P,, I Dk G with substitution 0. 
Notice that free variables can occur both in a goal and in programs of the list 
p1 1. . .I P,. For th’ 1s reason in rules (2) and (3) we apply substitutions not only to 
goals, but also to the programs in the list. Since the initial program P, is a set of 
closed clauses and the initial goal is a closed formula, they do not contain free 
variables. Free variables can be introduced into a goal by renaming the existentially 
quantified variables associated with the goal itself (rule (4)); free variables can be 
introduced in the list of programs by rule (5) whenever there is some free variable 
occurring in the set D of a block goal D 3 G. Existential variables are renamed 
once, as soon as the existential quantifier is dropped by rule (4), whereas universal 
variables of a clause are renamed every time the clause is selected to resolve an 
atomic goal (rule (2)); notice that the free variables which possibly occur in the 
clause are not renamed. 
Rule (3) is defined in such a way to preserve the sharing of variables between 
G,, G, and the programs in the list and to prevent from an improper use of the 
free variables in the programs. For example, given the list of programs L= 
{s(a), q(b)lh&+Mx)~ h w ere x is a free variable, the goal G = p(u) A p(b) is 
not operationally derivable from L. Instead, the goals p(u) and p(b) are individually 
operationally derivable from that list. 
The above operational semantics provides a rather abstract interpreter for the 
proposed language. More concrete interpreters can be obtained by applying a 
sequence of transformation steps to it, using, for instance, the methodology described 
in [9]. In that paper it is shown how to transform a nondeterministic recursive 
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interpreter for a logic language into a deterministic iterative one based on the data 
structures commonly used by Prolog interpreters and compilers. It is also shown 
that the extensions proposed in this paper can be dealt with efficiently by means of 
the well-known techniques used to implement blocks with static scope rules in 
conventional programming languages. 
8. Conclusions and related work 
In this paper we have presented an extension to positive Horn clause logic obtained 
by introducing implication in goals as a tool for structuring programs. Many of the 
results of this paper were first presented in the shorter paper [5]. The idea to add 
the standard programming language concept of block to logic programming 
languages was already proposed in [9], mainly from the implementation viewpoint. 
In this paper the concept of block has been defined more formally. 
We have mentioned throughout this paper Miller’s proposal for introducing 
modules in logic programming [ll, 121. Our approach is very similar to that of 
Miller, since the locality of clause definitions needed to define modules has been 
achieved essentially by introducing implication in goals. Since the implication goal 
has in our case a different semantics, our language results to be statically scoped 
instead of dynamically scoped as that of Miller. In [13] however, it is shown how 
a form of lexical scoping can be provided by using universal quantification on goals. 
The proposal by Monteiro and Porto [14] of a “contextual logic programming” 
is very close to our proposal as far as the semantics chosen for the implication goal 
is concerned. In fact, they define a module (called a unit) as a set of context 
dependent predicate definitions, that is, in the terminology introduced above, as an 
open block. Moreover, like in our proposal, the external context of a unit is structured 
as a list of units with visibility rules for clauses similar to those of our language. 
The most remarkable difference of their proposal with respect to ours is that names 
can be associated with units so to have a module facility and therefore the same 
unit name can be used in different contexts. Moreover, the structure of a context 
in which a goal is proved (that is the set of clauses that can be used for its refutation) 
depends on the dynamic sequence of context extension calls preceding the goal. 
The proposals mentioned above were put forward with the main purpose of 
adding a module facility to logic programming languages. However we believe that 
open blocks are more suitable for programming in the small, whereas modules 
should define closed environments or, anyway, interact with the external environ- 
ment in a very limited and disciplined way through a well specified interface. Thus 
we are presently investigating extensions to logic programming with module con- 
structs based on closed blocks [6,7]. Besides adding an implication operator for 
proving a goal within a module, we have introduced another operator to give names 
to modules, which allows us to define parametric modules. We believe that the two 
extensions of Horn clause logic, namely (open) block constructs and module 
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constructs can be usefully integrated, providing a language suitable both for pro- 
gramming in the small and for programming in the large. 
Appendix A 
To prove that the mapping Tp,, is monotone and continuous, we shall make use 
of the following lemmas. Let I,, I2 and X be Herbrand interpretations. 
Lemma 10. Zf Z, c I*, then Tp,I,(X) c Tp,12(X), for all X. 
Proof. If A E Tp,,,(X) then either AE I, s Z2 and then AE Tp,,,(X), or there is 
G + A[P] such that X z G and then A E Tp,,2(X). 0 
As a consequence of this proposition we have that, for I, E I2 
{X: Tp,II(X) E X} 2 {X: Tp.,2(X) c X) 
and then 
f-l{X: Tp,,l(X) c X1 s n{X: TP,I~(X) z X1; 
that is, 
T;,,(0) c T;,,(B). 
Lemma 11. Zf I, G I,, then T:‘,(0) > G=+ TF12(0) z G. 
Proof. By structural induction on G. 
l If G = T, the proposition obviously holds. 
l If G = A, then A E T:,,(0) E T;,>(0) (by Lemma 10). 
l If G = G, A G2 or G = 3xG’, the proposition holds trivially by induction. 
l If G = D 2 G’, then 
T:,,(0) > D = G’ 3 T&,(0) > G’, with Xi = T~,l(0) 
=-a T”,,x2(0) > G’, with X2 = T;,,(0) 
(by inductive hypothesis since, as a 
consequence of Lemma 10, 
X, c X2) 
=+ T:,,(0) > D = G’, 17 
Lemma 12. If X, c_ Xz then X, t GJX, > G. 
Proof. By structural induction on G. 
l If G = T, obvious. 
l If G=A then 
X,>A + AEX,SX* 
=+ X2>A. 
l If G = G, A G, or G = 3xG’, the thesis obviously holds by inductive hypothesis. 
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l If G=DIG’the 
X, > D 3 G’ + T”,,,(P)) > G’ 
+ T”,,,,(0) > G’ (by Lemma 11) 
+ X,>DxG’. 0 
Theorem 5. Tr,t is monotone; that is, if X, G X2 then Tr,, (X,) C_ Tr,, (X2) 
Proof. Let AE TP,,(X,). If AE I then A E TP,,(Xz), since I c TP,,(Xz). Otherwise 
there is a G + A E [P] and X, > G. By Lemma 12 we have that X2 > G, so A E 
TW(X2). 0 
Lemma 1 (already stated in Section 4). Let I, G I, c I, c . ’ . be a sequence of Herbrand 
interpretations. If G is a goal and UyCO I, > G then there exists a k > 0 such that Ik > G. 
In order to prove Lemma 1, we shall first prove the following Lemma 13. Let us 
consider the following definitions: 
Jo({~,)) = 6 (I,), 
,=o 
.I,({l,})(k,, . . . , ki, D,, . . . , D,) = Tkr D,,J,-,((i,~Kk ,....i k,-,,D, >..., rU(0); 
&{I,]) = Ik, 
Jk({Ijl)(k, 2. . .t k,,D ,,..., D,)=Tk’ D,,J:-l(ff,D(k I,../ k ,.I/ L) I..... D,-,) (0). 
Lemma 13. Let G be a goal, i a positive integer, I, G I, c I2 C_ ’ . . a sequence of 
Herbrand interpretations (we shall denote it by {I,}) and k, , . . , k, and D, , . . . , Di 
two tuples (of length i) of positive integers and of programs respectively. If 
.I,({I,})(k,, . . ., ki, D,, . , D,)> G then there exists a ks0 such that 
J;({I;})(k,, . . . , ki, D,, . . . , D,)> G. 
Proof. By induction on the number n of levels of nesting of 13 in G and D,. 
(a) If n = 0, we shall prove the thesis by double induction on k, and on the structure 
of G (G = D 1 G’ does not occur in this case). 
(al) Let us consider the case ki = 0. 
l If G = T, obvious. 
l If G=A then 
Ag.I,({I;})(k,,. . ., ki, D ,,.. ., D,)= To. Dt,J,-,({l,))(k ,,...j k, _,,D, /, D,_,)(0) = 6% 
l If G=G,AG*then 
Ji({l,})(k, 2.. .y k, D, 9.. . > Di)> G, A G, 
* Jili({l,l)(k,, . . . , k, D,, . . . , Di) > G, 
and J,({l,})(k,, . . . , ki, D,, . . . , Di)> G2 
j J;({I,})(k,, . . . , ki, D,, . . . , D;)> G, 
and _Il({l,})(k,, . . . , k;, D,, . . . , Di) > G, for some 1, h 2 0 
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(by inductive hypothesis, since ki does no change and G, and G2 are substructures 
of G). Let k be the maximum between 1 and h. By a generalization of Lemma 
10, we have 
J:({l,H(k,, . . . , k,, D,, . . . , Di)> G, and JF({Zi})(k,, . . . , ki, D,, . . . , Di)> G2 
and therefore J”({Z,})(k,, . . . , k,, D,, . . . , D,)> G, A GZ. 
l If G = 3xG’ then we have a proof analogous to the previous one. 
(a2) For kj > 0, if G = T or G = G, A G, or G = 3xG’, the proof is the same as for 
ki = 0. 
l If G = A, then we prove that 
A~Ji({l,})(k, ,..., ki, D, ,..., 0;) + A~Jf;({Zj})(k,,...,ki,D,,..., 0;) 
by induction on i. 
If i=O then 
A~jD({l,})=fi I, 3 AEZ~=J{({Z,}) for some kz0. 
j-0 
If i > 0, then 
There are two cases: 
(1) AE-L,({I,l)(k,, . . , L,, D,, . . . > &,I 
+ AEJ~_,({Zj})(k,,. . , k,_,, D,,. ., D,_,) for some k>O 
(by the inductive hypothesis on i) 
+ AE.Zf({Z,})(k,, . . ., kj, D,,. . ., D,) for some ka0. 
(2) There is a G’+ A E [Ql such that Tb,.:,_,((l,))(k ,,..., k, ,,n ,,..., &fJ) > ~3’ 
+  there is a G’+ A E [ Di] such that 
J,({ZjJ)(k,, . . . , k,_,,k,-1,D ,,..., D,)>G’ 
+ there is a G’+ A E [D,] such that 
Jf({Z,})(k,, . . .) ki_,, k,-1, D,, . . .) Di)> G’ 
for some kz0 (since by inductive hypothesis the thesis holds 
for k,-1) 
j Ac#({Z;})(k,,..., ki, D, , . . , D,) for some k 2 0. 
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(b) Now, let us consider the case n > 0. We assume, by inductive hypothesis, that 
the thesis holds for at most n - 1 levels of nesting of 3 in G and D. Again we prove 
that the thesis holds by double induction on k, and on the structure of G. 
(bl) Let k, =O. 
l IfG=TorG=AorG=G,~G,orG=3xG’theproofisthesameasforn=O. 
l G = D 1 G’ then 
J,({l,})(k,, . . , k,, D,, . . . , D,)> D= G’ 
* TF&,j,cr I,.. .~,,n, ,..., II,, > G’ 
* J:I({ TL,J,~~~~~,~~ ,,..., L,,o, ..., &@)I) > G’ for some h 2 0 
(by inductive hypothesis, since G’ contains at most n - 1 levels of 
nesting of 1). 
+ T” I~,J,(iI,~)Ch,. .,k,,[,, ..., ,,,(0)> G’ for SOme h 20 (by definition of Jib 
=+J ,+,({l,})(k,, . , k,, h, D,,. . ., D,, D)> G’ for some ha0 
* J:+,(U,H(k,, . . . , k,, h, D, , . . . , D;, D) > G’ for some h, k > 0 
(by inductive hypothesis, since both G’ and D contain at most n - 1 
levels of nesting of 3). 
=$J T” n,J~Cjl,))C!,,, .. L,,~~ ,,..., ,,,(0) > G’ for SOme h, k 2 0 
=3 T” ~~~J~I(I,~~(k,.....h,,D,....D,~~~~ > G' for SOme h, k 2 0 
(by Lemma 12, since T” G T”). 
=S J;({I,})(k,, . . , kj, D,, . . . , D,)> D= G’. 
(b2) For k, > 0, if G = T or G = A or G = G, A G2 or G = 3xG’, the proof is the 
same as for n = 0 (k, > 0). The case G = D 2 G’ is the same as for k, = 0. 0 
The proof of Lemma 1 now follows immediately from Lemma 13, if we take i = 0. 
Theorem 6. TP,, is continuous; that is, if I,, G I, z I, c . . * is a sequence of interpreta- 
tions, then 
Is Tp,,(Ii)= Tp,, . 
I =,I 
Proof. To prove this equality, we prove the inclusion in the two direction. 
For all j we have Z, s I_):=,, Ii, so, by the monotonicity of TP,,, 
and thus 
6 TP,,(I,)G T,:, 
I =o 
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If AE Tp,r(U~o I,) then either AE I or not. If AE I then AE IJE,, T,,(I,), since 
I G Tp,, ( Ii) for all i 2 0. Otherwise, there exists a G + A E [P] and UzC, Ii > G. By 
Lemma 1 there is a k 2 0 such that Ik > G. Thus A E Tp,,( Ik) c L_fLo Tp,,( f,). Cl 
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